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With an ageing population and declining labour force growth productivity is becoming
increasingly important as a source of economic growth. Despite this importance,
governments fear the productivity word because of public misunderstanding of its
meaning. For many years the author believed that Canada’s weak productivity
performance reflected inappropriate public policy. Despite most of the public policy
agenda that was put forward to improve productivity being implemented, productivity
growth in this country since 2000 has actually deteriorated. This suggests that the private
sector bears more responsiblity for Canada’s productivity malaise than previous thought.
A research agenda with a focus on firm behaviour from a micro approach is needed to
obtain a deeper understanding of Canadaès terrible productivity record and to develop
actions to boost productivity growth.
RÉSUMÉ
Comme la population vieillit et la croissance de la population ralentit, la productivité
prend une importance grandissante en tant que source de croissance économique.
Malgré son importance, les gouvernements ont peur d'utiliser le terme " productivité ",
car le public comprend mal son sens. Pendant de nombreuses années, l'auteur a cru que
le faible rendement du Canada en matière de productivité était le résultat de politiques
publiques inadéquates. Malgré la mise en œuvre de la majorité du programme de
politique publique proposé pour améliorer la productivité, dans les faits, la croissance de
la productivité au pays s'est détériorée depuis 2000. Cette situation suggère que le
secteur privé serait plus responsable du ralentissement de la productivité au Canada que
l'on a cru dans le passé. Il faudrait mettre en place un programme de recherche visant les
comportements des entreprises selon une approche microéconomique pour arriver à une
meilleure compréhension du bilan désastreux du Canada en matière de productivité et
prendre des mesures pour stimuler la croissance de la productivité.
I APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY to confess my
failure. As time is limited I will restrict myself
to one failure, that being everything I have ever
done on productivity. At a minimum I am hop-
ing the confession will bring some sort of
cleansing. More optimistically, I look to it as
part of a redemption process. I do not know
what is in it for you, the reader. But I do not
want you to leave because the rousing finish
features a desperate plea for your help. It is
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only with such help from my friends that there
is any chance of redemption.
Perhaps it is fitting to look at my failure on
productivity in terms of my productivity. The
input includes decades of research and many
years when I had the opportunity to shape and
implement public policy that might affect pro-
ductivity. In brief, the input is considerable
although as part of my feeble defense I note pro-
ductivity was not the singular topic I pursued.
Canada’s Recent Productivity 
Record is Terrible
No matter the perspective, the output side is
pathetic. Output per hour worked in the busi-
ness sector only grew 0.7 per cent per annum in
Canada over the past decade (Chart 1). As there
was some capital deepening, multi-factor pro-
ductivity did not grow at all. Not only is this
record inferior from the Canadian historical
perspective, but it is one of the slowest paces of
productivity growth internationally. Despite all
its ailments, the U.S. economy churned out a
productivity growth rate about triple the Cana-
dian pace. The level of output per hour in the
total business sector and in manufacturing in
Canada is now only about 70 per cent the U.S.
level (Chart 2). The situation is a little better
than that if one makes the data strictly compara-
ble, as John Baldwin of Statistics Canada pains-
takingly and periodically does.
 In the 1950s and 1960s Canada had the third
highest level of productivity among the original
24 OECD countries. Now it stands 17th. Since
1980 only three of the OECD countries have
had a worse productivity growth rate than Can-
ada.
The Public and Hence 
Governments will not 
Talk about Productivity
Things are even worse in terms of generating
interest in and understanding of productivity
among Canadians. Polls and focus groups tend
to find that many Canadians think productivity
means working harder for less pay. In other
Chart 1
Real Output per Hour Growth, Business Sector, 
Canada and the United States, 1947-2010
(average annual growth rates)
Source: GDP in chained dollars and total hours worked from the Productivity and Costs Program of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics for the United States, and annual averages of quarterly estimates from the Productivity Program
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words, exactly the opposite of an economist’s
definition.
Understandably, Canadian governments react
to the public’s misunderstanding, even fear of
productivity by borrowing a concept from Harry
Potter. Just as Lord Voldemort must be referred
to as “He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named” or the
“Dark Lord” so must productivity be globally
replaced by “innovation” or “competitiveness”.
In this public environment, government cannot
bring itself to mount any sort of campaign with
profile to address what is surely a brewing crisis.
My failure includes the capacity to provide
sound advice to governments. Indeed, if asked
today what policy changes should be imple-
mented to promote productivity growth I would
need to say I do not know. Certainly I can rec-
ommend tackling the remaining elements of the
agenda I have had for a long time. But govern-
ments have already done about 70 per cent of
that agenda and meanwhile productivity growth
slowed. Why should one think implementing
the remaining 30 per cent will have very differ-
ent effects?
Despite General Disinterest, 
Much is at Stake with 
Productivity
Much is at stake in this productivity failure.
After all, growth in an economy is determined
by labour force and productivity. By the end of
this decade, Canada’s labour force will likely
only be growing about 0.3 per cent per annum.
If the 0.7 per cent recent productivity growth
pace does not improve, then Canada will experi-
ence 1 per cent real growth. Add in 2 per cent
inflation, and the overall nominal economic pie
would only be expanding 3 per cent per year.
That will not permit much increase in wages or
corporate income. With unchanged tax rates it
would mean a similar 3 per cent growth in gov-
ernment revenues, federally and provincially.
Try stuffing the recent 6 per cent growth in
health care spending into that envelope.
Some have thrown me a lifeline for the
defense by suggesting that productivity is not
such a great thing. For example, the spoils of
productivity are argued to have disproportion-

























































Relative Labour Productivity Levels (GDP per hour) 
in the Business Sector in Canada, 1947-2010 
(Canada as a per cent of the United States, US=100)
Source: CSLS Canada-US Productivity Database6 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
ductivity, it is argued, does not equate well with
self-perceptions of happiness. I would love to
grab these lines, but I do not buy it. To be sure,
productivity growth does not ensure higher
wages or greater happiness. But try achieving
either or both without productivity growth.
Productivity growth at least provides hope and
choices to a society. How society use its spoils is
another matter.
So a victim’s impact statement for my produc-
tivity crimes would be harsh. In the hope of
receiving a light sentence I hasten to try to
explain where I went so wrong.
The Conventional View was 
Public Policy was the Culprit
When I began my journey on productivity I
accepted a simple premise. Much of the blame
lay at government’s doorstep through inappro-
priate public policies. That government uni-
verse included all three levels. The premise was
not all that odd. There was much to dislike in
public policy in the 1980s and early 1990s. Can-
ada had high and variable inflation. Large and
growing public debt. Trade restrictions exter-
nally and internally. One of the highest rates of
taxation on capital in the world. The list goes
on. There was so much wrong with policy that it
seemed natural to assume that correcting it
would strengthen productivity. I will note at this
point I was far from alone in this premise.
Urged on by many others, governments at all
levels started to improve the policy setting. We
had the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and then
the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The inflation targeting regime came
into play in 1991. The archaic federal sales tax
was replaced with the GST in 1991 and some
provinces have come on board since.
Governments arrested the rise in public debt
in the 1990s. They reduced inter-provincial
trade barriers. They started a quiet revolution 
on capital taxation in 2000. Consider that in
Ontario the combined federal-provincial corpo-
rate income tax rate, including surtax, was
almost 45 per cent in 1999. It is headed to 25 per
cent. Both jurisdictions scrapped their capital
taxes. Depreciation allowances have generally
been brought into line with economic life. The
2000 federal budget that started this process was
the last I worked on. Had you told me at the time
where this revolution would have gone, I would
had called you insane. But it happened. And pro-
ductivity growth weakened.
Even by 2006 the Focus was 
Still on Policy
I was blind to my failure for quite some time.
On September 18, 2006 I published a productiv-
ity piece entitled “The Economists’ Manifesto
for Curing Ailing Canadian Productivity” that I
was quite tickled with at the time (Drummond,
2006). The article was an attempt to determine
areas of broad agreement among economists for
driving up productivity growth. It began as a bit
of a lark as I was growing tired of the joke that
economists cannot agree on anything. It became
more exciting when I realized how much agree-
ment there was on this subject. Differences of
opinion were essentially over the relative
weights on the various items.
The article pulled together the usual suspects
for raising productivity:
• Low, stable inflation;
• Lower public debt-to-GDP ratios;
• Free trade externally and internally;
• Promotion of competition including
removal of foreign ownership restrictions;
• Removal of barriers to firm growth, includ-
ing the jump in taxation from small to large
businesses;
• Removal of work disincentives including
those embedded in Employment Insurance;
• Reduction in regulatory burden;INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 7
• Lower taxation of capital;
• Lower marginal personal income tax rates,
especially for very low and modest-income
Canadians (although it was noted this might
raise labour force participation rather than
productivity);
• A shift away from taxing income and capital
toward consumption;
• Improvement in the selection and integra-
tion of immigrants;
• Increased investment in public infrastruc-
ture, especially transportation and electric-
ity;
• Re-investment in education; and
• Attention to the non-PSE steam as well,
including literacy, apprenticeships and
training
To that point the focus was entirely on public
policy and even within the policy sphere, almost
exclusively macro-policy.
The “Manifesto” only had one paragraph on
private sector behaviour. And even that merely
reflected a debate among economists on the
degree to which government should subsidize or
penalize certain behaviour.
A Light Goes on in 2010
By 2010 it struck me that governments had
acted on about 70 per cent of this agenda. And
productivity growth had not increased. In fact it
had weakened. Of course one could argue it
would have declined even more without the pol-
icy improvements. But it does not strike me that
this defense would generate much sympathy in a
jury.
So one must ask the question. If implementing
70 per cent of the original agenda did not bring
on stronger productivity growth, can one be
confident doing the remaining 30 per cent will
do the trick? Or one can ask whether the lags are
simply very long. Perhaps the previous bad pol-
icy setting so affected the business climate that it
will take years to see the full repercussions of
policy change.
Either way, one cannot and should not feel
confident that the trick to strengthening pro-
ductivity growth lies in completing this policy
agenda. That does not mean the agenda should
not be completed. It does mean that other things
have to be looked at. When one is going down a
road for a long time and finally realizes it is a
dead end, one might as well back up and see if
there is another route to getting somewhere.
Business Behavior Must 
be Scoped for Answers
That other route has to be private sector busi-
ness behaviour. Why has not the Canadian busi-
ness sector been more competitive, more
entrepreneurial, more productive? One must
look into this residual in the production func-
tion and try to determine what is going on.
For me a strong clue to look more carefully at
firm behaviour came from the 2003-2007 expe-
rience when record retained earnings and a
sharply appreciating Canadian dollar only pro-
duced modest real increases in Canadian invest-
ment in machinery and equipment and almost
no change in nominal values. Why did corpora-
tions just sit on their profits over this period?
Did they not realize that this was a golden
opportunity to ramp up their productivity to
better withstand global competition? Why
instead, did they leave so much of their earnings
in corporate bank deposits?
The corporate tax revolution had not reached
its peak then, but surely taxation was not a
strong obstacle. The only explanation I have
ever heard from business is that they expected
the appreciation to be temporary and when they
finally realized it was not, their bottom line
started to be hit by the recession.
Increasingly the questions I have on produc-
tivity are not macro in nature, but are routed in 8 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
private business behaviour. Why does only 4 per
cent of Canadian SME revenue come from
exports to the emerging economies? Why do we
have a much higher concentration of small firms
than the United States? Why did not firm size
grow in response to NAFTA, as had been pre-
dicted? Why did so many of the firms I dealt
with while at TD Bank try so desperately to
remain below the small business income thresh-
old? I could go on.
Productivity Research Needs 
to Shift to Micro-perspectives
The point is that the productivity research
effort must shift. It must go more micro than
macro. But the micro analyses must be aggre-
gated in a fashion to explain the overall national
trends.
New data must be exploited. Fortunately
there are promising developments on that front.
Statistics Canada has long had valuable business
micro data but due to resource and confidential-
ity restraints the data have been principally
available only to internal researchers. I under-
stand Statistics Canada has received funding to
address confidentiality issues, provide docu-
mentation, and ultimately make the data avail-
able to a broader pool of researchers. We also
now have Industry Canada’s Survey of Innova-
tion and Business Strategies. The Bank of Can-
ada’s business survey might also yield insights.
The pool of researchers needs to be expanded.
Reformed macro-economists are welcome. But
interesting answers seem more likely to come
from micro-economists and researchers in
labour markets, industrial organization and
business management.
The domain of researchers must also go
beyond government and academia. Let me use
Canada’s under-investment in information and
communications technology (ICT) as an exam-
ple. Canada has less than one-half the stock of
ICT per hour worked that the United States has.
Those in the industry say the actual situation is
even worse because Canadian firms tend to use
the same equipment less productively than their
American counterparts.
Why do Canadian and U.S. firms deal with
ICT so differently? Surely companies in the sec-
tor like IBM and Microsoft should have interest-
ing answers? So should Canadian management
consulting firms, on this and a host of other
questions. Such companies regularly do bench-
marking tests of Canadian firm behaviour
against that in the United States and elsewhere.
What do these studies reveal about Canadian
productivity? Companies such as banks with
large corporate client bases should be able to
shed some light on why Canadian firms seem
reluctant to grow.
International economic organizations must
join the research effort as well. Canada should
be the poster child for the OECD and IMF
because we adopted most elements of their par-
adigm. They preached that stable macroeco-
nomic policy and sound structural policy would
generate productivity-based growth. It has not
in Canada’s case. We are making these organiza-
tions look bad. Why would other countries fol-
low their advice when it has not worked well in
the case of Canada. We put on the recom-
mended make-up but have not turned out to be
so pretty. The situation is even worse for New
Zealand, the original hope as poster child.
These organizations could kick Canada out for
contaminating their data, or they could help us
figure out what has gone wrong.
Not so Easy to Separate Policy 
and Business Culture
Future research must not abandon the policy
perspective. It will prove impossible to com-
pletely separate policy and business culture.
Perhaps the whole productivity malaise should
be blamed on Sir John A. MacDonald. His eco-
nomic union created walls of protection forINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 9
Canadian industry that left them little incentive
to be productive. We still have large sectors pro-
tected from competition.
Consider the example of the small business
corporate tax regime to illustrate the link
between culture and policy. And the sheer num-
ber of questions for which there are not clear
answers. Firm size has to be a key issue in a new
productivity research agenda. Certainly relative
to the United States, Canada has a heavy con-
centration of small companies. And small com-
panies are less productive on average than large
companies. As well, they do less R&D and they
pay lower wages and usually offer fewer
employee benefits. For purely political reasons
Canadian governments have been driving down
the small business tax rate, in a few provincial
cases heading to zero. This create a gap between
the small and large business tax rates, meaning
that over an extended interval of income gains
small businesses face quite high marginal tax
rates.
We also observe a clustering of firms just
below the small business income threshold and
that cluster has been moving up in step with the
increases in that threshold over recent years. So
there appears to be a circumstantial case that the
taxation regime is one of the impediments to the
growth in firm size and hence a productivity
killer. But we do not observe the same clustering
by asset size. So maybe firms are growing but
paying out bonuses in order to protect the cher-
ished small business status. But then again it
could be argued that it would be better for
growth if these small companies retained the
earnings rather than bonusing out.
So why do small companies bonus out? Well,
in the bad old corporate tax regime up to 2000
that was actually economically rational. The
marginal tax rate over the range the small busi-
ness rate was lost went so high it exceeded the
top personal marginal income tax rate. It made
sense under this perverse policy setting to take
money out of the company and shift it to the
personal realm. But that is no longer the case.
Yes, the marginal rates faced by small businesses
rise over a span of income. But they do not go
that high. There is still much net gain to the
company from growing. And the small business
marginal tax rate no longer rises above the top
marginal personal income tax rate.
Yet I know from speaking to commercial cli-
ents of the TD bank that many businesses go to
extraordinary lengths to remain in the small
business classification for tax purposes. I just do
not understand why. If it ever made sense, it no
longer does thanks to the quiet corporate tax
revolution. Was the culture so engrained it has
not yet been dislodged? Are companies not yet
aware how the tax scene has been turned upside
down over the past decade? As you can see, I
have questions. I just do not have many answers.
I believe obtaining those answers will require a
combination of theory and street smarts.
A Coalition of Researchers 
Interested in a Micro-
approach
Having ever so slowly come to the conclusion
by 2010 that the road I was following was a dead
end, I have been spending time trying to bring
together a coalition of research interests to
study the micro-aspects of productivity and to
develop and disseminate the data that will be
required. I am pleased to say that quite recently
I sense some real hope for this initiative. There
are several federal government departments
interested, above all Industry Canada and Statis-
tics Canada. The presidents of large research-
intensive universities are keenly interested and a
number of their researchers are responding
favourably to the idea. Several management
consulting firms and ICT companies have
expressed interest. SSHRC is interested, but not
yet committed on funding support.10 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
This completes my defense. I confess I have
been unproductive in my productivity work.
Never one to play the hero, I note I have had
accomplices along the route. Errors were made
out of misunderstanding rather than malice. I
am low risk to re-offend. And finally, I have a
plan for redemption.
I simply ask for help rather than punishment.
That help involves all of you bringing new
research perspectives to Canada’s productivity
malaise. Together we can make up for an unpro-
ductive past. Macro-economists can change per-
spective. Labour market, industrial organization,
business management researchers can throw their
efforts into productivity. Management consulting
firms and large companies can build on their
firm-level insights. The effort may take a while.
But I am hopeful that within 2-3 years we can
build a better understanding of why Canada’s
productivity performance has been so weak and
will know what to do about it.
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